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INTRODUCTION-To

V OR NOT TO V

One of the most controversial features of the Telecommunications Act of 19961 is its intervention in longstanding disputes
about violence and indecency in the media. Due in part to the
urging of President Clinton and his Democratic allies, the new Act
requires that all television sets over thirteen inches include a "Vchip," a device that would allow parents to block violent and
indecent television programming
Despite its name, the V-chip is not a single chip at all, but a
combination of different technologies. All television programs currently have the capacity to carry extra information-like closed
captioning-as well as sound and pictures. An electronic circuit in
a television or cable box can be designed to block programs by
reading a numerical code broadcast along the same band used for
closed captioning. Viewers then use a remote control device to
select from a menu of choices as to how much violence, bad language, sex, and nudity they wish to tolerate. A rating system now
being tested in Canada features a five-number scale, with higher
numbers signifying more sex and violence. When the V-chip circuitry reads a rating equal to or higher than the consumer's preselected number, the picture is replaced by a large black box?

t Lafayette S. Foster Professor, Yale Law School. My thanks to Owen Fiss and
Scot Powe for their comments on a previous draft, and to Michael Adler for his research
assistance.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
2. § 551, 110 Stat. at 139-42. As its name implies, the V-chip technology has been
touted primarily as a means of controlling television violence. But its uses are not limited
to that category. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 specifically lists its concerns as
"sexual, violent, or other indecent material." § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 140.
3. Joseph A. Kirby, Device Would Let Parents Program TV for Children, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 7, 1996, at A26. The V-chip can also be designed to
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Critics charge that the V-chip raises serious First Amendment
problems. This essay explores a few of them. But my more important goal is to use the debate over the V-chip to rethink the
foundations of broadcast regulation. The federal courts, including
the Supreme Court, have justified content-based restrictions on
broadcast indecency partly on the grounds of the special nature of
the mass media. Yet their justifications for special treatment have
been, on the whole, unconvincing. I will argue that the real issues
have little to do with traditional justifications of scarcity, public
interest, and pervasiveness. They have to do with how different
media permit the filtering of information. Different communication
technologies are better adapted to different kinds of informational
filters. For example, broadcast media permit different and more
limited filters than print media. The V-chip promises to change all
that by creating a new system for filtering broadcast information.
But this new technology raises many new and unexpected problems. In particular, it raises the possibility that in the Information
Age, control of filters may be one of the most important forms of
power over human thought and human expression. In the Information Age, the informational filter, not information itself, is king.
I. THE DIFFERENCE BROADCASTING MAKES
For many years, broadcast media have been subject to much
greater content-based regulation than print media. For example, in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of FCC restrictions on indecency as applied to a radio
broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue.4 More
recently, the D.C. Circuit upheld "safe harbor" provisions that
permit indecent speech on broadcast television only from 10 p.m.
to 6 a.m.5
recall previous settings and block all unrated programs. Id. In order to prevent bad language from being transmitted, it must be able to block sound as well.
4. 438 U.S. 726 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
5. Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 111), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996). The relevant law actually permitted stations
to broadcast indecent programming from midnight to 6 a.m., but it also permitted public
television stations that go off the air before midnight to broadcast the same programming
starting at 10 p.m. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a),
106 Stat. 949, 954 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (Supp. V 1993) (Broadcasting of
Indecent Programming; FCC Regulations). Because the court found the exception for
public broadcasting to undermine the purposes of the legislation, it remanded the case to
the FCC with instructions to limit the ban on indecent programming to the period from
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First Amendment scholars are divided as to whether this
special treatment is constitutional. They have good reason to be
concerned. "Indecency," like violence, is an unclear and wavering
category. By definition, it includes sexually explicit speech that
could not be regulated as obscene. This is a much larger category
than many people imagine. It includes, for example, not only
expression expressly designed for sexual stimulation, but also expression that is offensive to some but not obscene because it has
genuine literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Thus, indecent
expression can include not only the more salacious contents of the
Playboy Channel, but also political speeches laced with four-letter
words and serious discussions of AIDS and homosexuality.
Similar problems hound the regulation of violence.6 It is not
always clear what kinds of violence do the most harm to children.
Is the violence in cartoons worse than the violence in live action
programs? Does unrealistic violence do more harm than depictions
that bring home the horrors of war and death? Does the violence
reported on the local and national news contribute to the problem,
and if so, should it also be restricted in the interests of our children?
In assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on violence
and indecency, it is important to remember that the programming
at issue here would be constitutionally protected if it appeared in
print media, in a movie theater, or on a videocassette. There must
be some special justification for abandoning general First Amendment principles in broadcast regulation.
Traditionally, content-based regulations of the broadcast media have been justified on two basic grounds: the scarcity of the
airwaves and the pervasiveness of the medium. Other explanations-the fact that broadcasters hold licenses from the government, and the importance of empowering democracy-tend to be
parasitic on the scarcity rationale. Unfortunately, each of these
justifications becomes problematic when applied to questions of
violence and indecency.
The most common argument for special content-based regulations of the media is based on the scarcity of the airwaves. The
word "scarcity" is poorly chosen. All valuable resources are scarce.

6 a.m. to 10 p.m. ACT Ii, 58 F.3d at 669-670.
6. For an accessible (and skeptical) view, see THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER &
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 120-34 (1994).
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The scarcity problem in broadcasting stems from the fact that no
two broadcasters can use the same frequency at the same time in
the same geographical area, or they will block each other out.7
But this problem can be dealt with by creating a system of property rights dividing up the airwaves according to frequency, time,
place, and broadcasting power; it does not require a system of
government licenses.' Moreover, the existing system has actually
created an artificial scarcity in broadcast television. Many VHF
and UHF channels go unused in many localities.'
The spread of cable television has increasingly made the scarcity argument implausible. More than half of all American homes
now receive cable," and cable television wiring passes by most of
the rest." If the government is really interested in reducing scarcity and increasing choices, it should simply subsidize cheap cable
television for the remaining households instead of artificially limiting access through the award of broadcasting licenses.
In any case, scarcity is a particularly badly suited justification
for content-based regulation of violence and indecency. At best,
scarcity provides a reason to put things on the air, not to keep
things off. Because airtime is limited, governments may require
that stations broadcast certain kinds of public interest programming, like local news or children's programming; it may also require that candidates for public office have the opportunity to pur-

See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994) (citing National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943)), reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct.
30 (1994).
8. Critiques of the scarcity rationale are by now legion. For a sampling, see LUCAS
A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987);
MATrtHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 1013-20 (1986);
Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1959, at
1, 12-27.
See KRATITENMAKER & POWE, supra note 6, at 87-88, 217-18 (discussing the
FCC's restrictive channel allocation policies).
10. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 862, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1992) (stating that nearly 56 million households and more than 60% of all households with televisions are cable
subscribers); Robert S. Tanner, Note, The Data Transfer Industry: Communications Regulation for the Next Century, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 917, 922-23 (1995) (citing
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D. Va.
1993)).
11. LELAND L JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 179 (1992)
("[C]able systems have become accessible to more than 95 percent of the nation's

homes."); see also US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1192 (W.D. Wash.
1994) ("[Clable service is now available .

.

. at 96% of all U.S. homes

aff'd, 48

F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996).
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chase airtime and respond to personal attacks. But limited resources do not justify keeping particular programming off the air if
there is otherwise sufficient room for it. To be sure, requiring that
some things be on the air will necessarily require broadcasters to
leave other things off. But the scarcity rationale does not by itself
give the government any right to choose what that forgone programming will be, unless it thinks that scarcity entitles it to dictate
the whole of the broadcaster's day. The justification for keeping
indecency off the air cannot be to make room for the presidential
debates; it must lie elsewhere.
Many other justifications for regulation of violence or indecency often tend to be parasitic on the scarcity rationale. For
example, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'2 the Supreme
Court suggested that content-based regulation was permissible
because broadcasters do not own the airwaves outright. 3 They
hold licenses from the government, and therefore the government
can impose conditions on that license. By itself, this argument
tends to prove too much. The government's conditions may be
unconstitutional conditions. The government does not license the
airwaves as an act of governmental largesse-the usual means of
justifying conditions on licenses.' Rather, the licensing scheme
exists because the government decided to take complete control of
the airwaves and parcel out licenses instead of auctioning off
rights to broadcast at certain times in certain locations and with
certain degrees of broadcast strength. The government does not
license the manufacture and distribution of paper or printing
presses. Even if it did so, it could not constitutionally justify imposing content-based conditions on their use. Thus, the conditionson-licensing justification ultimately rests on the prior justifications
for licensing, which depend in turn upon the scarcity rationale.
FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has suggested that restrictions on
violence and indecency on television may be justified by the fact
that the First Amendment is designed to protect democracy.' 5 He

12. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
13. Id. at 394.
14. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 199 n.5 (1991) (stating that restrictions
on abortion counseling by recipients of Title X subsidies do not violate the First
Amendment because the subsidy may be declined); Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (holding that the ban on lobbying activity by tax-exempt
charitable organizations is not an unconstitutional condition).
15. Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves: What Does the Public Interest Require of
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argues that violent and indecent programs were not what James16
Madison had in mind when he wrote the First Amendment;
they do nothing to promote discussion of public issues. This seems
to conflate an argument that some speech is of lesser constitutional value with an argument that the broadcast media are special.
Assuming that Chairman Hundt's claim about degrees of constitutional value is sound, it applies equally well to violent and indecent depictions in movies and the print media. It cannot by itself
distinguish broadcast media from other media. 7 In any case, the
argument tends to prove too much: A great deal of non-indecent
and nonviolent programming on television has only the faintest
relationship to promoting democracy. Yet it does not follow that
this programming is subject to content-based regulation because it
is also of low constitutional value.
In fact, the argument from democracy is best viewed as an
adjunct to the scarcity argument. Because airtime is scarce, television must make room for programming that enhances democratic
values. But again, this argument does not justify keeping indecency or violence off the air; rather, it justifies keeping public interest
programming on.
The other major justification usually offered for special treatment of the broadcast media is that these media are uniquely
"pervasive." Like the term "scarcity," the term "pervasiveness" is
also badly chosen. In fact, courts seem to use the term "pervasive"
to stand for a conglomeration of five different sorts of justifications about broadcasting, often not fully distinguished. The broadcast media are pervasive first, because they are the most powerful
medium of communication, and second, because they are ubiquitous. Yet the fact that a mode of communication is particularly
powerful or ubiquitous is not necessarily a reason for regulating it.
That would suggest that the only speech that escapes regulation is
that which doesn't do its job very well.
Television Broadcasters?, 45 Duke LJ. 1089, 1097 (1996).
16. See id.at 1126.

17. In any case, it is an opportunistic invocation of original intention. Chairman
Hundt is surely not suggesting that we hew to the original intentions of the Framers in
all areas of free speech law. They were clearly more censorious than he would be comfortable with. The best version of his argument is Meiklejohn's. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1961). But Meiklejohn's argument has its own difficulties. I rehearse some of them in
J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE LJ. 1935
(1994).
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A third interpretation is that television is "pervasive" because
it is constitutive of our culture. We now live in a television culture, in which an increasing number of our cultural allusions are
drawn from television. If we are what we eat, then perhaps we are
also what we watch. Hence, many people secretly and not so
secretly worry that whoever controls television controls culture,
and they want to make sure that our culture is not thereby debased. But when the matter is put so starkly, the desire to use
government to control culture by controlling what people watch on
television cannot be a constitutional justification for the regulation
of free expression.
A fourth meaning of "pervasiveness" is a restatement of the
captive audience doctrine. Television is "pervasive" in the sense
that there are significant cultural pressures to have a television set
and keep it in one's home. Once television is in the home, it is
difficult to protect unwilling listeners from encountering programs
they don't want to watch other than by keeping the television
turned off at all times. The captive audience doctrine, it is said,
has special force in the home because expectations of privacy are
higher there." Although television can be watched outside of the
home-in a sports bar, for example-the fact that the overwhelming majority of Americans watch it at home is said to justify content-based regulation that would be impermissible if applied to the
print media. However, when applied to adults, the captive audience rationale tends to prove too much. One can also accidentally
come across printed material in the home. A newspaper or magazine might have offensive language buried on page fifteen; a videocassette might have offensive language or pictures in a "coming
attractions" segment. But the fact that such a "sneak attack"
might occur in the home does not justify content-based regulation
of print media or videocassettes.
The fifth and final interpretation of "pervasive" is, to my
mind, the most important, and the only one that really justifies
special content-based regulation for the broadcast media. It is a
concern about parental control of children's viewing habits. 9
Television is pervasive because it is difficult to keep it away from
children and children away from it. Once television is in the

18. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978).
19. Id. at 749; ACT III, 58 F.3d at 661.
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home, parents must continually supervise what children watch,
which is difficult and time-consuming. Many households now own
multiple television sets, so that children can watch in the privacy
of their own room, away from parental supervision. It is always
possible for parents to remove television completely from the
home. However, because of television's cultural importance, many
parents do not feel able or willing to deny their children the right
to watch television at home, especially when the children can
watch it at their friends' houses.
Although concerns about children make the most sense doctrinally, it's important to reiterate that they have little to do with
scarcity. Even if there were 500 channels, the problem of parental
supervision would still exist, and might even be enhanced. Nor
does this justification for regulation turn on the fact that broadcast
television is an especially powerful medium of communication, or
that it is conveyed in the easily assimilable form of pictures. Parents can watch rented movies on a VCR that are every bit as
unacceptable for children as anything one might watch on television. But these movies cannot be regulated in the same way that
television broadcasting can."
This final rationale for broadcast regulation is often described
as the protection of children, but the real issue is parental control.
The two are not necessarily the same. We generally assume that
parents love their children and discipline them in ways that are,
on the whole, best for them. But parents do not always do so, and
we do not second-guess their decisions except in extreme cases.
Parents are currently free to bring home R-rated videos full of
violence and nudity and let their children watch them. They can
subscribe to premium cable channels showing these movies and
leave their cable lock boxes unused. If violence and indecency
really are bad for children, and we think protection of children is
paramount, we should take steps to criminalize such behavior,
whether or not parents misguidedly believe such exposure is
harmless. Yet I suspect that such proposals would be severely

20. With a few exceptions-zoning regulations for adult movie theaters and procedures for pre-screening obscene films--the regulation of movies is largely along the lines

of the print model. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986)
(upholding zoning requirements for adult movie theaters), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1132
(1986); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (same), reh'g denied, 429
U.S. 873 (1976); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (establishing procedures for
reviewing obscene films).
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criticized, and not merely by civil libertarians. Most parents do not
want the government deciding what is best for their children when
the decisions are contrary to their wishes; they want the government to assist them in controlling their children in ways they think
appropriate.2
In short, behind the slogans of "scarcity" and "pervasiveness"
lurks the real issue of parental control. This explains, I think, how
current calls for media regulation are tied to the underlying anxieties of the moment. Calls for censorship (which exist at all times)
arise most heatedly in moments of great cultural change and uncertainty. After all, where cultural mores are relatively stable,
censorship can be achieved informally and without the constraints
of law. But we now live in a time of cultural upheaval, caused by
significant economic and technological changes as well as changes
in mores. Not surprisingly, many people are especially anxious
about these changes; they see the world they once knew slipping
away. Like the drunk who searches for his keys near the lamppost
because the light is better there, people tend to fix upon the mass
media as the likely cause of cultural ills and regulation of the
mass media as a likely solution.
The First Amendment prohibits relatively direct control over
what adults can be exposed to. Hence the focus naturally turns to
control of children, who are under their parents' authority and
whom parents see as the natural inheritors and perpetuators of
their cultural values. The desire to preserve culture in the face of
widespread cultural change (and, in particular, economic and technological change) leads to anxieties over children and the desire to
reassert parental control over them.
The problem we face today, however, is that new forms of
technology increasingly upset established patterns of parental control. Children can operate VCRs and computers better than their

21.

The D.C. Circuit recognized that parental control and protection of children were

separate interests, but it did not acknowledge the degree to which they might conflict in
practice. ACT 11I, 58 F.3d at 660-61. In fact, safe harbor rules do not perfectly mesh
with the goals of enhancing parental control. As Chief Judge Harry Edwards pointed out
in his dissents in Alliance for Community Media and ACT III, safe harbor rules actually

preempt some parental choice, because children cannot watch certain programming (for
example, a documentary on AIDS prevention) even if parents want them to. Alliance for
Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 145-46 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Edwards, CJ.,

dissenting), cert granted, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995); ACT III, 58 F.3d at 670 (Edwards, CJ.,
dissenting).
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parents. They spend more time in front of the television than at
the family dinner table. Technology threatens to render parents'
means of cultural reproduction ineffectual. It is no wonder, then,
that new forms of communication technology, whether they be
movies, records, radio, television, or the Internet, produce new
cultural anxieties and new calls for censorship and control.
Courts are not insensitive to these cultural and political pressures. When these pressures are combined with the complexities of
the dual regime of broadcast and cable regulation, it is no wonder
that the current scheme of indecency regulation is both confusing
and contradictory, and that doctrinal treatments tend to display
gaps and deficiencies. Two recent D.C. Circuit cases show that
court's fitful attempts to deal with the problems. In Action for
Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III),22 the D.C. Circuit upheld
the "safe harbor" provisions of Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, which permit indecent broadcasts
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. In Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC,2 the D.C. Circuit upheld Section 10(b) of the 1992 Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act.24 That provision requires cable television operators who carry indecent programming on leased access channels to segregate the programming
on a single channel or group of channels and to block access
unless a subscriber requests it in writing. The Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in this case.
Although the D.C. Circuit justified the safe harbor rules in
ACT III as a narrowly tailored means of protecting children, its
justification was undercut by the fact that Section 16(a) did not
apply at all to cable television, giving children ample alternative
sources of dissolution and corruption.' Perhaps in response to
this deficiency, the D.C. Circuit extended the pervasiveness rationale of Pacifica to cable television in Alliance for Community
Media. The court reasoned that because cable television provides
more than 60% of all households with television, it has become
the dominant mode of video delivery. Moreover, "[a] cable subscriber no more asks for such programming than did the offended

22. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 701 (1996).
23. 56 F.3d 105, 145-46 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct 471 (1995).
24. Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(b), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532
(j)) (Supp. V 1993).
25. See ACT II1, 58 F.3d at 672 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
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listener in Pacifica who turned on his radio,"' and cable is just
as accessible to children as broadcast programming.
One might criticize Alliance for Community Media on the
grounds that cable is different from broadcast television, relying
on the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC.' But the reasons why the Court differentiated cable from broadcast television were just variations on the old
scarcity rationale. Because there are lots of cable channels, the
scarcity justification doesn't apply.' In fact, given the existence
of cable, the scarcity justification probably shouldn't apply to the
broadcast media either, but that is beside the point. What is important is that the scarcity rationale is separate from concerns
about parental control, and in the latter respect cable is largely
indistinguishable from broadcast television.
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit was not completely consistent
in its application of this rationale. It argued that the safe harbor
provisions applicable to broadcast television would not be an adequate way of protecting children from indecency in cable television: "Even during late hours, some unsupervised children will be
watching cable television and thereby have access to indecent
' However, this is equally true of broadcast televiprogramming."29
sion. Thus, one wonders, if safe harbor provisions were thought
adequate to protect children from indecent broadcast programming, why are they inadequate for cable?3" Indeed, if the rationale of ACT III is correct, why isn't the constitutionally preferred
solution to block indecent programming on cable only between 6
a.m. and 10 p.m. (unless the consumer requests otherwise in writing), but require no blocking during the safe harbor period?
II. THINKING ABOUT MEDIA IN TERMS OF FILTERS

It might be best to start over again and think
the real differences between broadcast and other
believe that the answer to this question must begin
that all communications media share in common.

about where
media lie. I
with features
All media, I

26. Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 124.
27. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S.Ct. 30 (1994).
28. 1& at 2456-57.
29. Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 125.
30. Especially since the D.C. Circuit assumed that constitutional scrutiny would be
lower for content-based regulation of broadcast media. ACT II, 58 F.3d at 660.
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shall argue, whether voice, print, or broadcast, share two features
in differing degrees. The first is the ability of the recipient to
exclude information; the second is the presence or absence of
filtering mechanisms. Filtering and excludability are related to
each other, because filtering information31 usually depends on the
present or potential ability to exclude it.
Print media lend themselves easily to filtering precisely because print media are easy to exclude. If I want to avoid the
information contained in a newspaper, I can simply avoid buying
it. If I go into a bookstore, I can buy the book I want without
buying other books. I can take the books I want home and then
lock them up so that my children cannot see them. Print media

are also easy to select and organize. Because my books are discrete units, I can organize them alphabetically. I can read them
when I want and in the order I want.

Filtering mechanisms fall into three basic types or functions-they can organize information (for example, by classifying
it), they can select information, or they can block information.
Within the last category, one can block information for one's self
or for others (for example, one's children). All of these functions
have important relationships to excludability. Blocking information
clearly involves exclusion, but so do selection and organization. To
select information, I must be able to take it and not other information. To organize information, I must be able to create categories into which that information (and not other information) falls,
and through which that information could (in theory) be selected.32

31. When we think of excludability, we think of captive audiences, and when we
think of captive audiences, we think of justified expectations of privacy. Although excludability and privacy are related concepts, they are related in complicated ways. Practical
excludability does not by itself determine whether we have a justified expectation of
privacy. On the one hand, expectations of privacy seem to be based in part on the practical possibility of exclusion. Because one can be assaulted by billboards or by voices in
the street, one's justified expectations of privacy are lower there. On the other hand,
expectations of privacy are sometimes thought justifiable whether or not excludability is
practically possible. Even though we may not be able to prevent electronic eavesdropping, we have a justified expectation that others will not eavesdrop.
32. Thus, in alphabetizing a list, I make selection by first letters possible. Placing
books in the Library of Congress cataloguing system enables readers to find books on
some subjects without having to look at others.
Some forms of organization have a more attenuated relationship to excludability.
Suppose I merely imagine a system for cataloguing library books. Although this system
organizes information, the organization is not implemented. The imaginary system merely
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Although I have divided up filters into blocking filters, selectig filters, and organizing filters, these functions substantially overlap. The V-chip is a good example. The V-chip is a blocking filter
for children, but it also is a selecting filter for their parents. It lets
adults choose whether or not to view violent or indecent material.
Equally importantly, the V-chip is an organizing filter, because it
creates two types of programming-programming that is blocked
by the V-chip and programming that is not. Or, if the V-chip has
multiple settings, it creates multiple categories of programming.
Installing an informational filter simultaneously raises and
lowers pre-existing costs of searching for, blocking and receiving
information. A V-chip raises costs of receiving information substantially to children, and moderately to adults. But it also lowers
costs as well, because it subdivides the body of programming and
makes certain types of choices easier.
Throughout this article I shall speak in terms of "informational" filters. Nevertheless, because of its computer-age connotations,
the term "information" is likely to be understood much too narrowly. Many people associate information with statements of fact,
or with strings of ones and zeros that can be read by a computer.
Yet much of what people want to and do filter out is not information in that limited sense. They want to filter out dirty language,
violence, and nudity. They also want to filter out dangerous ideas
and views they do not agree with or expressions that offend and
anger them. "Information," in the broader sense I am concerned
with, is cultural information. It does not consist merely of statements of fact, but includes anything that can be understood by
someone in a culture, and have a corresponding effect on their
reason, emotions, or behavior. Cultural information is the counterpart of cultural understanding. Hence it is involved in not only the
production of knowledge or ignorance, but also persuasion or
offense, refinement or coarsening, ennoblement or corruption.
Because there is too much information in the world, all communications media produce attempts at filtering by their audiences.33 The desire to filter is not, however, always matched by

gives directions for implementation, which if enacted, would require selection, and hence

the possibility of exclusion. Finally, purely mental organization of information does not
involve physical selection and exclusion, but it does involve mental selection and exclusion.

33. The desire by producers of information to gain an audience and the contrary
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available methods of filtering. Each medium offers different means
of exclusion, and different costs of exclusion. Filtering is an effective strategy precisely to the extent that excludability is possible
and cost-effective. Each medium's ability to permit exclusion determines and limits the kinds of filtering that are available to it.
Even when filtering is used to organize information or facilitate
selection, it is still limited by the possibilities of exclusion characteristic of the medium.
An example from the print media may illustrate this point.
Suppose that Time magazine started publishing lots of four-letter
words and sexually suggestive pictures. Eventually Time magazine
would get a reputation as the sort of magazine that does that sort
of thing. Parents would, after a time, discover this. Some of them
would cancel their subscriptions to Time magazine; others would
not keep it lying around the house. Advertisers would also notice
the change. They would discover that the demographics of the
readership had changed and would shift their money accordingly.
A magazine's reputation can act as a kind of filtering device,
although it is social rather than technological. It signals the likely
content of the magazine. Many filters work by offering signals to
the audience. Examples are titles of books and headers in the
delivery of e-mail. Nevertheless, Time's new reputation would have
little practical effect as a filtering device unless parents could
exclude it by refusing to buy it or by not bringing it into their
homes. If they could not act on Time magazine's new reputation
by excluding it, the use of reputation as an informational filter
would do little good, other than perhaps to warn parents to discount what they read in the magazine (which is itself a filter of a
34
different sort).
desire by recipients to block out unwanted information creates an arms race between filters and ways of getting around filters; hence the use of flashier graphics, louder music,
and increasingly hyperbolic claims to attract people and gain a slice of their increasingly
valuable and limited attention spans. Audiences use remote controls to flip through channels during commercials; advertisers respond by varying the content, length, and timing of
their advertisements, and broadcasters respond by varying the length of time between
shows. Marcia Mogelonsky, Coping With Channel Surfers, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec.
1995, at 13. Occasionally methods of filtering and methods of evading filters start to
merge. For example, best seller lists are both means for weeding out books that might
be interesting to read and means by which publishers promote books as worth reading.
Kudos on the backs of books also have this dual character.
34. This example also suggests that filtering is a heuristic device for dealing with
information, and as a heuristic device, it is usually imprecise. For example, I may use
Time magazine's new reputation as a reason not to bring it into my home. There may
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III. FILTERING AND CHOICE
At first glance, filtering seems to overlap with a much more
familiar concept--choice. But the two ideas are distinct in important ways. Not all informational filtering involves conscious or
deliberate choice by an audience. Indeed, the importance of filters
consists precisely in the ways that they obviate or skew choice
even as they enable it. "Choice" is a word with largely positive
connotations of personal responsibility, respect for individual intelligence and protection of personal autonomy. Filtering, on the
other hand, is morally ambiguous; it may make little demands on
individual intelligence, may involve considerable surrender of personal responsibility and may actually undermine personal autonomy. Filtering, especially in the Information Age, increasingly involves delegation of choice to another party. Thus, it is very important not to collapse filtering into choice, thereby absorbing the
latter's positive moral connotations.
Let me give an example drawn from my own experience as a
legal academic. Currently there is more literature being published
in law and related academic fields than any person can possibly
keep up with. Hence I and many other legal academics make use
of filters. One is a periodicals list. Another is searching on databases like LEXIS and Westlaw. The periodicals list gives me the
titles of articles in different law reviews. This filter is widely distributed in identical form to many academies; I do not receive a
version tailored to my specific needs. By contrast, an informational
filter like a LEXIS or Westlaw database is partially modifiable by
the use of search terms.
Both the periodicals list and the computer databases already
filter out publications even before they offer me possibilities for
choice. For example, I do not have a choice about what law-related journals to include or exclude. In LEXIS and Westlaw databases, I am limited to the journals that are currently on-line and the
databases' selected periods of coverage. They will show me nothing published before 1982, for example. Recently a fellow law
professor wrote me asking for a cite to an article I wrote in 1990.
She could not find the article on LEXIS because the article was
be lots of things in the new Time magazine that are just like the old Time magazine-useful news stories, for example. But the overall reputation, and not the precise
content of the stories, will determine whether parents subscribe and what kinds of advertising revenues the magazine generates.
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published in Cardozo Law Review and LEXIS' coverage of that
review begins in 1994. Any articles written before that time do not
appear on the database. My colleague depended heavily on LEXIS
because it was easy to use; looking outside of it took considerable
effort.
The LEXIS database has an interesting effect on the cost of
obtaining and filtering information. It lowers the costs of searching
for materials if one uses the database, while the costs of more
traditional hard-copy searches remain constant, at least in the
short run." Furthermore, if one shifts to LEXIS as a primary
research tool, certain types of filtering choices (i.e., searches) become easier and less expensive to make than others, even if the
latter choices would be easier or less expensive using a different
filtering system.'
This example demonstrates one of the important side effects
of informational filters. If everyone uses LEXIS to do basic legal
research, articles that do not meet LEXIS' selection criteria will
increasingly disappear from view, because the filter changes the
differential costs of searching for and receiving certain kinds of
information. And this example suggests a larger point. The structure and content of public communication can be and often is
shaped by the informational filters people most commonly use and
depend on.
I use filters like the periodicals list and LEXIS and Westlaw
because they have definite advantages. I do exercise choice in
using them. Yet my choice is at the same time limited. In using a
particular filter, I have delegated choice to some other entity-in
this case, the people who put together the periodicals list, and the
people who run LEXIS and Westlaw. I hope that they know what
they are doing, and that, over time, they will include most of the
journals I might want to read. But they might not, and, as a result, my choices may be limited or skewed without my even knowing it.
Literary critics have always known about filters. They call
them canons and anthologies. Canons and anthologies are special

35. In fact, the costs of more traditional searches might even increase in the long
run if older skills and sources atrophy as a result of mass shifts to LEXIS and Westlaw.
36. Law librarians have long understood that the shift to computer databases alters
the way legal research is conducted. See, e.g., JAMES A. SPROWL, A MANUAL FOR COMPUTER-ASSISTED LEGAL RESEARCH 14-15 (1976).
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kinds of filters that involve special forms of delegation. People
who construct canons and anthologies decide what is important to
read, and, by implication, what is less important to read. Canons
and anthologies can be very helpful filters. They introduce people
to the works most worth reading or most often discussed in the
academic literature. In this way they can enable not only choice,
but also the search for truth. But as repeated debates over canonicity have shown, canons and anthologies can also skew or inhibit
these values.
More generally, the marketplace produces any number of
informational filters. Book publishers screen manuscripts to determine which ones are most likely to be worth reading. Bookstores
stock, classify, and sell books by category and likely readership
interest. Magazines specialize in particular kinds of stories and
particular political approaches, and the public can use their reputations as informational filters.
All of these examples involve different filters that work in
different ways, but each filter involves some form of delegation.
When many people need to filter the same body of information,
there are considerable efficiencies in delegating that task to someone else. The need for filtering gives rise to people who provide
that service, either through market demand, through social custom,
or through governmental regulation. Filtering and delegation thus
go hand in hand. And because increasing amounts of information
inevitably lead to the need for filtering, they inevitably lead to the
need for delegation. This gives people to whom we delegate the
construction of informational filters an important degree of power.
It is a necessary power caused by the limited space in our minds
and limited time available for absorption, as well as the positive
need to block harmful, useless or offensive information. The power of delegation is, if anything, enhanced in an age of exploding
information. We must-and do-trust and rely on delegations to
filterers to give a relatively appropriate picture of the world. For
it is the picture of the world we get through informational filters
that will largely determine whether we think that the people we
have delegated this power to are, in fact, doing their jobs properly. There is something ironic about this. In the Information Age,
we were told, information would be power. It is turning out to be
quite the opposite. In the Information Age, it seems, power does
not rest with those who have access to information. It rests with
those who filter it.
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FILTERING AND MASS MEDIA

Let me summarize the argument so far. All communications
media produce too much information. So in that sense, all media
have a problem of scarcity. But the scarcity is not a scarcity of
bandwidth. It is a scarcity of audience. There is only so much time
for individuals to assimilate information. And not only is there too
much information, some of it is positively undesirable. As a result,
all media give rise to filtering by their audience, or, more importantly, by people to whom the audience delegates the task of
filtering. For a filter to operate properly, any criteria of filtering
must be linked to an effective ability to exclude. Many desirable
ways of filtering information may not be possible or cost-effective
given the nature of the media.
The problem of practical filtering exists in all media. It is
inherent to any form of communication. However, the problem
appears differently for different media. Media differ in terms of
the kinds of blocking, selecting, and organizing filters practically
available to them. It is easy to block books and videocassette
tapes, because books and videocassette tapes are individual and
separate units of consumption. They can be put in stores on
shelves or locked behind counters. It is easy to keep some out and
let others in. It is also easy to put them in different shelves according to category. They can be read or viewed in any order you
choose, at any time of day.
If broadcast media are special, they are special in this respect:
Broadcast media offer limited practical means of filtering. Parents
may want to keep their children from certain kinds of television
programs. But their ability to do so is limited.
Broadcast communication is a linear stream of information in
a predetermined and unchangeable order sent out at a predetermined and unchangeable time. This form of communication limits
the ways one can filter information. There are basically only three:
turning the receiver off completely, turning it on only at designated times, or changing the channel. Parental blocking is similarly
limited. Parents can control children's viewing habits by turning
the television off at specified times or forbidding children to watch
certain channels. If children insist on watching television when
their parents are not at home or cannot supervise them, parents
have no choice other than to remove the television entirely. Because the number of filtering solutions is limited, there is a poor
fit between desirable filtering mechanisms and practical exclud-
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ability. Only very coarse filters can be made to work. This coarseness is the distinctive characteristic of broadcast media.
Consider the problem from the perspective of a single broadcast station attempting to organize information for the benefit of
its viewers. Other than simply not broadcasting a program, the
only means of organizing information is to segment it by time.
And that is precisely what broadcasters do. They put different
types of programming on sequentially, so that viewers can choose
what programs to watch by time period. Broadcasters then try to
turn these limitations to their advantage, through strategic scheduling of programs as regular series at preordained times, through the
use of special blocks of programming, or through repeated showings.
Not surprisingly, temporal filtering is also a major method of
FCC regulation. Examples are the Prime Time Access Rule and
the safe harbor provisions. 7 These regulations organize programming in sequences of time and require that some programs not
appear at certain times. They act like blocking or organizing filters.
It is theoretically possible, using a VCR, to convert broadcast
communication into something like books or videocassette tapes.
Imagine taping each half hour of the day on each channel on a
separate videocassette tape. One could then shuffle the order of
the tapes, watching them in the desired sequence. One could also
keep television programming locked up in a dresser drawer away
from children. In this way one could convert the television day
into the equivalent of a video library. It could then be filtered and
organized in much the same way as a library or video store. But
this process is expensive and time-consuming; it would require
constant attention and a separate recording machine for each
channel. And it does little to block children from seeing what is
actually being broadcast, unless parents can make sure that children only watch the tapes rather than the original.
I hope it is clear by now that the problems of filtering and
regulating broadcast media-especially where children are concerned-have nothing to do with scarcity or ubiquity. They have
to do with the kinds of filters effectively available for this partic37. § 16(a), 47 U.S.C. § 303 note (Supp. V 1993) (Broadcasting of Indecent Programming; FCC Regulations) (safe harbor provisions); 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (j), (k) (1981)
(Prime Time Access Rule).
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ular medium of communication. Broadcast media differ from other
media not because of limited bandwidth but because of limited
methods of filtering. Nor are broadcast media special because they
involve pictures and music on a screen rather than stationary text
on a page. Videocassette tapes offer the same kind of expression
and are also shown on television screens, but they lend themselves
to much easier forms of filtering. Because broadcast information is
broadcast-sent out in single sequential streams at predetermined
times-it can be blocked, selected and organized in only a limited
number of ways. This is a kind of scarcity, but it is a scarcity of
filtering mechanisms, not a scarcity of channels. Even if there
were ten million channels, all broadcast simultaneously, these
problems would still arise. The special nature of the broadcast
media can now be revealed. It was never about scarcity. It was
never about pervasiveness. It was always about filtering.
The V-chip and similar technologies promise to change the
nature of broadcast media because they offer the possibility of
new types of filtering mechanisms. They help the broadcast media
become more like the library or the video store, although the
former will never be the same as the latter two. The approximation would work best if broadcast and cable could offer literally
hundreds of channels, so that there would always be something to
watch as an alternative to blocked-out material, and so that the
same or similar programs would be available at different times.
Perhaps the best approximation would be a pay-per-view system,
in which each home could order any available programming at any
time of day. (This system could also be priced as a flat fee if that
were economically feasible.) We are not yet at that point in video
delivery. But we may well be in a few years' time.
The great promise of new filtering and broadcast technologies
lies in these changes to the organization of the medium. When we
think of the future of the broadcast media and cable, we immediately think of an increased number of channels, and the end of
scarcity. But this is a confusion. What matters is not the increased
number of channels by itself, but the increased number of channels coupled with new ways to block, select, and organize programming. If broadcast media can permit blocking and time-shifting of programming easily, cheaply, and painlessly, they will have
largely approximated the filtering status of the print media. At
that point, it is hard to see why they should be denied the same
First Amendment status.
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Before discussing the special problems of the V-chip, it might
be helpful to ask how this analysis of filtering mechanisms applies
to two other current subjects of controversy--cable television and
the Internet. In Alliance for Community Media, the D.C. Circuit

argued that the pervasiveness rationale for regulation of indecency
on broadcast television also applied to cable television. 8 Senator
Exon and others have argued that protection of children equally
justifies regulation of indecency on computer networks.39
The traditional reason to differentiate cable television from
broadcast television is that cable channels are not scarce. But, as I
have argued above, the scarcity rationale does not justify the regulation of indecency in broadcast television; the problem broadcasting faces is not scarcity of bandwidth but coarseness of filtering
mechanisms. Without something like the V-chip, cable television is
in no better a position than broadcast television, and should be
treated accordingly, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's suggestion to the contrary in Turner Broadcasting.' Thus, if the safe
harbor provisions are justified for broadcast television, they are
justified for cable as well. And if they are unconstitutional for
cable television, they are equally unconstitutional for broadcast
television.
Interestingly, in Alliance for Community Media, the D.C.

Circuit took a somewhat different view. It upheld a regulation
requiring that all indecent programming on "leased access channels" be segregated on a specific channel or set of channels. 41
These channels must then be blocked unless the subscriber requests access in writing. It rejected the suggestion that safe harbor
provisions would be a less restrictive alternative, stating that children might still watch indecent programming after hours. 2
It is certainly true that segregation and blocking are alternatives feasible for cable operators but not for individual broadcasters. In this sense, cable currently provides additional filtering
mechanisms that broadcast television does not. But additional
mechanisms for effective filtering are a reason for less censorship,
38. 56 F.3d at 125.
39.

142 CONG. REC. S706-07 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statements of Sen. Helms and

Sen. Coats); 141 CONG. REC. S9770-01 (daily ed. July 12, 1995) (letter introduced by
Sen. Exon).
40. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
41.

56 F.3d at 123-25, 129.

42. Id. at 125.
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not more. Hence the constitutionally preferable method for leased
access programming should be mandatory blocking except for the
safe harbor period between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., unless the cable
subscriber requests that the blocking be removed for the entire
programming day. If children are sufficiently shielded from indecent broadcast programming after 10 p.m., there is no reason to
believe that they are not sufficiently shielded from indecent cable
programming after 10 p.m. Adults should be able to watch shows
on cable after these hours, if they have paid for them in their
cable subscription. To be sure, most cable companies may choose
to put programming likely to be indecent-like that on the Playboy Channel-on premium channels that are routinely scrambled
unless the subscriber specifically requests them. But there should
be no legal bar to offering the Playboy Channel as basic cable, as
long as the cable company abides by the safe harbor provisions.
Once a feasible V-chip technology is in place, differential
treatment of cable and broadcast television will be even less justified. Mandatory segregation and blocking of indecent programming
should be completely eliminated. The blocking technology available in the V-chip, coupled with temporary safe harbor provisions
(as described more fully below), should be sufficient protection for
both media; no greater restrictions on broadcast indecency should
be constitutionally permissible.
The Internet presents an entirely different set of problems. In
terms of available filtering mechanisms, the Internet much more
closely resembles a bookstore or a video store than a television
set in the home. In particular, the Internet does not require temporal filtering. An Internet user can filter information on the
World Wide Web by subject matter using search engines like
Lycos or Infoseek. Indeed, filtering mechanisms on the Web are in
many cases more advanced than those widely available for much
of the print media. Usenet groups-the Internet equivalent of
bulletin boards-are already differentiated by subject matter. Because of information overload, the messages in Usenet groups do
tend to be removed after a certain time. But these messages can
be selectively downloaded and viewed at the users' leisure. In any
case, many web sites and FTP sites are quasi-permanent, with an
inventory that changes no more often than that at a local Barnes
& Noble. From the standpoint of available filters at least, the
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appropriate model for the Internet is the bookstore, not the television broadcast.43
The real problem facing the Internet is not the lack of appropriate and powerful filters; it is possible to divide and subdivide
the information coming from the Internet in any number of ways.
The real problem is the abilities of parents. If filters cannot be
made relatively costless for parents to use, they will be ineffective
in practice even if available in theory. This very real concern
brings me back to the V-chip.
V. PARENTAL CONTROL AND THE V-CHIP

There are two standard objections to blocking filters like the
V-chip. The first is that parents will be unable to use the blocking
device. The second is that, even if they do, children will be able
to break through and watch the programming anyway. One finds
similar fears expressed about the Internet. Although parents may
be able to use a program like SurfWatch to keep children off
sensitive parts of the Internet, children are often more computerliterate than their parents. The parents won't be able to use the
software, and the children will easily be able to break through.
To address these concerns, we must distinguish between the
costs of blocking access to information and the costs of breaking
through the block. It does not follow that a blocking filter that
creates high barriers must itself be difficult or inconvenient to
operate. A double-bolted lock is a perfect example. It is easy for
homeowners to use but difficult for burglars to break through. In
like fashion, the goal should be to create filters that are relatively
costless for parents to operate but very difficult for most children
to bypass.
43. In cyberspace, the closest thing to the broadcast medium is the electronic chat
line, but even that is really closer to the model of telephone communication. Chat lines
can be segmented according to subject matter or age requirements, and parents can then
use filters to ensure that children cannot enter certain chat "rooms" which have subject
matter or age requirements. The existence of plentiful and adequate filtering mechanisms
means that the broadcast model should not apply. Cf Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (rejecting total ban on "dial-a-porn" services in light of available blocking mechanisms).
E-mail presents special problems. E-mail messages can be filtered by subject matter
and by thread. However, the subject matter of an e-mail message may not disclose its
indecent or harassing nature. Nevertheless, in this respect e-mail is very much like regular mail, and to this extent the constitutional forms of regulation of indecency should be
the same.
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This is not a problem of constitutional law. It is a problem of
technological design. Different kinds of blocking filters differ with
respect to these two variables. Childproof caps are relatively ineffective because they are difficult for parents to operate as well as
children, so the parents don't use them properly. But it's quite
possible to design a V-chip that parents can easily use but children
will find difficult to crack. A simple example would be a four-digit
number, like that on an ATM card, that enabled access to the
programming menu. No doubt even these minimal costs can be
further reduced with sufficient ingenuity.
Similarly, in designing Internet blockers, the goal should be to
create an interface that is easy to use and that offers powerful
blocking results. This task is hardly beyond the capabilities of the
private computer industry. Enormous sums of money are devoted
each year by these companies to produce increasingly user-friendly
and increasingly powerful interfaces. The whole point of designing
security features in commercial software is to make them painless
for the user but difficult for the hacker.
It is important, nevertheless, to recognize that some children
will be able to "hack through" the blocking devices their parents
use. In any population of children, some will be more clever and
more computer-literate than others. Some will be very clever, and
a few may even be able to break into Defense Department computers. But a filter design need not be foolproof to be acceptable
as a constitutionally preferable alternative to a total ban. It need
only be able to block most children or make it very difficult for
them to break through.
This principle is clear enough from the existing safe harbor
provisions in broadcast television. In its ACT HII opinion, the D.C.
Circuit acknowledged that some children would be able to expose
themselves to programming not intended for them simply by staying up late, or sneaking a television into their room at night."
Indeed, statistics quoted by the court indicate that many, although
not most, children watch television after 10 p.m.45 This did not
undermine the value of the ban on indecent programming between
10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Rather, the court reasoned, the safe harbor

44. See ACT 111, 58 F.3d at 665. Moreover, it is at least theoretically possible that
children could tape indecent programs during the safe harbor period and view them
during the hours they are awake.

45. See id.
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provisions are a reasonable balance between free expression concerns and the protection of children. If the temporal filters involved in the safe harbor rules need not be perfect in blocking all
children, neither do the technological filters involved in the Vchip.
VI. THE KEY IssuE: AVOIDING ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF
REGULATION

I am concerned about the V-chip for different reasons. Unless
the FCC regulations are carefully designed, they will simply superimpose new content-based regulations over the restrictions we now
have. Without care and forethought, the V-chip will not liberate
broadcast programming from censorial power; rather it will increasingly subjugate it.
Ideally, the V-chip should be understood as proposing a sort
of constitutional bargain. In return for offering parents a method
of protecting children from violent and indecent programming, the
government should henceforth be forbidden from engaging in
other content-based regulation of violence and indecency in the
broadcast media. If the V-chip technology is implemented properly, it will shift the focus of broadcast regulation from regulation of
content to regulation of filtering of content. Most importantly, it
will turn broadcast regulation towards more appropriate concerns:
ensuring access to as many speakers as possible. It will move us
away from an improper fixation with what should not be on television and toward a proper concern with what must be.
What I fear is that the V-chip will be used instead to impose
an additional layer of content-based regulation on top of existing
indecency prohibitions and safe harbor provisions. It will be used
to ensure not just that children are not exposed to certain programming, but that adults are not exposed either. Proponents of
censorship are inevitably tempted to protect adults in the name of
protecting children. The V-chip must not be allowed to facilitate
this desire.
Courts must be especially vigilant to ensure that a "multi-layered" approach to broadcast regulation does not result. I propose
46. It is important to stress that no parental control system, like no filtering system
generally, can be foolproof. Because the V-chip will be installed only in sets larger than
13 inches, children will still, in theory, be able to get around its blocking capabilities.
They need only purchase a nine-inch set and a magnifying glass.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1131

a general principle for assessing the constitutional use of technological filters like the V-chip. Because lack of effective filtering
mechanisms is the real justification for content-based regulation,
creation of new and more effective filtering devices should always
create heavy presumptions against any remaining content-based
restrictions. The more easily and broadly a V-chip or other technological filters can be implemented, the more suspect must be
any restrictions on violent and indecent broadcast programming.
The safe harbor provisions offer a good example of how to
apply this principle in practice. Even after the V-chip has been
perfected, there still may be a limited and temporary need for the
safe harbor provisions. By its terms the Telecommunications Act
of 1996 applies only to television sets over thirteen inches, and its
requirements do not take effect until at least two years after the
date of the Act.47 Not every television is likely to be replaced as
soon as the V-chip is introduced; even though the V-chip can be
encoded in a cable box, not all families will immediately rush out
and get one. Televisions (and replacement cable boxes) cost money. Most likely there will be a significant period in which many
families lack the V-chip. For this reason, it may be necessary to
retain the safe harbor provisions for a "sunset" period of, say,
seven years.' After that point, anyone who uses a non-V-chipcompatible television would be on notice that it would not be able
to block out programs. If they wanted that capability, they would
have to purchase a V-chip-equipped television or a V-chipequipped cable box. If they refused to upgrade their equipment
after seven years, they would have only themselves to blame if
they were shocked and surprised by what they saw while flipping
channels.
The regulatory scheme should not, however, use the lack of
V-chip capability as an excuse to pile on additional regulations
that put broadcast programming in a worse position than it was in
before the Act. The regulatory scheme should not require that the

47. § 551(c), 110 Stat. at 141; § 551(e)(2), 110 Stat. at 142.
48.

This figure depends on how one sees the likely future of technological develop-

ment. If the V-chip is placed in standard cable boxes or in inexpensive add-on devices, it
is reasonable to assume that most households that want them will purchase them more
quickly, and the sunset period could be reduced accordingly. If, on the other hand, the

V-chip is mainly implemented through new television sets, then something like ten years
may be necessary for most old sets to wear out and be replaced.
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safe harbor rules remain in force indefinitely merely because some
televisions do not yet have V-chip equipment.
VII. THE RATINGS SYSTEM

The development of a ratings system poses a second constitutional problem. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is cleverly
drafted to create an almost irresistible set of pressures on private
industry to create and implement a voluntary ratings system. It
does so because, as the drafters well realized, a government-created ratings system imposed against the will of broadcasters would
pose serious constitutional issues. Thus, the Act prescribes that
"distributors of video programming" have a year to come up with
a workable ratings system acceptable to the FCC, "in consultation
with appropriate public interest groups and interested individuals
from the private sector."49 If private industry does not come up
with rules satisfactory to the FCC, the job will fall to an advisory
committee appointed by the FCC. This advisory committee would
be comprised of "parents, television broadcasters, television programming producers, cable operators, appropriate public interest
groups, and other interested individuals from the private sector." '5 Not surprisingly, this committee sounds like the same
groups the FCC would probably consult to determine the acceptability of any industry ratings system.
The Act's "fail-safe" provision deliberately stops short of
requiring that broadcasters accept the ratings system devised by
the advisory committee. It requires only that, if video programming already is rated by the broadcaster, the rating must also be
encoded so that it can be read by a V-chip system."' Left unclear
is whether the Commission would be empowered to require that
broadcasters accept the advisory committee's rating system. Also
left unclear is whether the FCC would have the power to insist
that all programming be rated before it can be broadcast.

49. § 551(e), 110 Stat. at 142. At a meeting held on February 29, 1996, leading
representatives of the media industry agreed in principle to provide a private ratings
system by January 1997. Alison Mitchell, TV Executives Promise Clinton a Violence Ratings System by '97, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al.
50. § 551(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 140. The advisory committee is to be "fairly balanced in
terms of political affiliation, the points of view represented, and the functions to be performed by the committee." Id.
51. § 551(b), 110 Stat. at 140.
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The fail-safe provision is left deliberately toothless to avoid
constitutional problems of prior restraint and compelled speech.
Instead, the true goal of the legislation is to present broadcasters
with a set of unpalatable alternatives. If they do nothing, they risk
the appointment of an advisory committee telling them how to
rate their programs. Even if the FCC cannot constitutionally require that they accept the ratings system as a condition of broadcasting, there will be enormous public pressure on broadcasters to
accept a system that has already been worked out with attendant
public fanfare. Faced with this possibility, broadcasters and distributors will instead choose to create their own ratings system.52
The recent meeting between President Clinton and media representatives suggests that the pressure has already been felt and
indicates that the media industry will take whatever steps are
necessary to head off a government-appointed advisory committee.53
This is precisely what the FCC hopes will happen. If the
industry creates its own ratings system, the FCC actually has much
greater power and influence than it would have under the fail-safe
provisions. The FCC can decide whether to approve the ratings
system or not, using basically the same players that would have
formed an advisory committee. If the industry does not conform
sufficiently to the FCC's wishes, the FCC can declare the industry
not to be in compliance and once again hold up the threat of an
advisory commission.
The result of this calculated gamesmanship will be a set of
guidelines largely acceptable to the FCC and implemented without
government expense or the creation of a new governmental bureaucracy. Moreover, because the guidelines are "voluntary," the
FCC does not have to require that broadcasters accept them, or

52. For similar reasons, if one broadcaster then decides to rate its programming,
others will feel enormous pressure to follow suit. Thus, when Rupert Murdoch broke
ranks and announced that his FOX network would rate shows regardless of what the
other networks did, he made it virtually inevitable that NBC, CBS, and ABC would

agree to a ratings system. See March Gunther, Fox Leads Pack in Vow to Adopt Ratings
System, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 16, 1996, at C1.
53. Alexandra Marks, TV Industry Problem: Rating 400,000 Shows, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONrrOR, Mar. 1, 1996, at 3 (noting that media companies originally resisted V-

chip ratings but ultimately decided to "declare victory" and capitulate). CNN founder Ted
Turner-who supports the V-chip-put it best when he wryly noted that "we're voluntarily having to comply." Kathy Lewis, TV Ratings Promised by January, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 1, 1996, at IA.
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issue regulations that all shows be pre-screened. It need merely
insist on these conditions as the price of its approval of the "voluntary" ratings system. In this way the FCC can achieve through
threats much of what it could not have achieved through direct
regulation.
Although the clever drafting of the legislation is designed to
avoid constitutional problems, the very idea of an advisory committee, whether as an actual ratings body or as a threat the FCC
hopes never to employ, is constitutionally troubling. From one
perspective, there is no problem with the government designing a
content-based information organization system and leaving it up to
private parties to decide whether to accept or reject it. For example, there is nothing unconstitutional about the development of the
Library of Congress cataloguing system or its near universal acceptance in public and private libraries as a means of organizing
information. The problem comes when the government insists that
information must be organized according to content in a certain
way or it cannot be published at all. And when the government
uses threats, whether overt or concealed, to achieve this result,
constitutional values are surely implicated.
The first problem that any ratings system will face is what to
do about unrated programming. Must all television programming
be given a V-chip rating, or only some of it?' Must all programming be submitted for ratings, or can a broadcaster refuse to
accept or provide a rating? Most importantly, if less than all television programming is rated, can the unrated shows still be broadcast?
Although the 1996 Act does not specifically require that all
programming be rated before it can be broadcast, this is clearly
the eventual goal of the V-chip system.' Once a ratings system is

54. Current estimates suggest that there are over 600,000 hours of programming
yearly on a 70-channel cable system, as opposed to around 1,200 hours of movie programming rated annually by the Motion Picture Association of America. Ed Bark, TV
Ratings Sure To Be a Daunting Task, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 1, 1996, at 24A.
55. The Act is deliberately ambiguous on this point. To avoid the fail-safe provisions,
"distributors of video programming" must "establishfl voluntary rules for rating video
programming that contains sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which parents
should be informed before it is displayed to children," and "agreeo voluntarily to broadcast signals that contain ratings of such programming." § 551(e)(1), 110 Stat. at 142. The
Act does not say that all such programming must be rated-only that rated programming
be broadcast as rated. However, it is hard to believe that the FCC would be satisfied
with a result in which an industry ratings system was developed but not implemented on
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in place, the FCC can then issue regulations to discourage or
segregate unrated programming. Chairman Hundt has specifically
contemplated such a strategy. He argues that any programs that
remain unrated can constitutionally be relegated to the safe harbor
period.56 Yet this solution is too facile. It threatens to put enormous numbers of programs in a worse position than they were in
before the implementation of the V-chip. It violates the key constitutional principle I have enunciated: that the development of
new technological filters should decrease government restrictions
on adult viewing, not increase them.
A requirement that all programs be submitted to a private
industry council before they can be screened has many of the
features of a prior restraint. The problems would be even greater
if the ratings (or the guidelines for them) were entrusted to a
government-appointed Television Commission. But it should also
be constitutionally troublesome for government to insist that
speakers gain the imprimatur of a delegated private organization
before they can be allowed access to the airwaves.
The goal of the 1996 Act is that broadcasters will voluntarily
rate their own programming, making the prior restraint problems
vanish. But not all broadcasters will be able or willing to do this
for all of their programming. Many people who speak over cable
and over the airwaves are not networks or network affiliates. They
will necessarily have to rely on third parties to pre-screen their
material. Thus, the problem of pre-screening by some organization
other than the speaker cannot be avoided. 7 This is especially so

a virtually universal basis, at least for pre-recorded programming other than news and
sporting events. Even if individual members of the Commission could accept such a fig
leaf, political pressures against it would be almost unbearable.
56. Hundt, supra note 15, at 1129.
57. A press conference following the February 29, 1996 agreement between President
Clinton and major media executives revealed some of the potential problems. Jack
Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of American, suggested that, because
of the mammoth task of rating thousands of hours of programming, program distributors
(as opposed to program producers) would have to rate their own shows. When asked the
obvious question about what would happen if producers and distributors disagreed about
a rating, Valenti suggested, "We'll cross that river when we get there." Media Industry
Agrees to Rate TV Programs by 1997 for Use with V-Chip, DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTVE,

Mar. 1, 1996, § A, at 41.

At the same press conference, Decker Anstrom, president of the National Cable
Television Association, argued that cable networks, but not cable operators, would do the
rating. However, National Association of Broadcasters President Ed Frits opined that
networks would rate their own shows while syndicators and local stations would rate
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if the government is seriously interested in ensuring conformity of
ratings among different program distributors. For example, without
a credible third-party enforcement mechanism, some distributors
may be tempted to "underrate" programs because they fear that a
more stringent rating would reduce advertising revenues. 8
It may be objected that the requirement of pre-screening and
pre-rating is not really a prior restraint, because all unrated programming can still be broadcast during the safe harbor period. But
this argument is deficient on two grounds. First, as argued above,
the safe harbor regulations must gradually be phased out after the
new system is adopted. Second, and more important, the unconstitutionality of a prior restraint is not avoided even if there is another means of expressing one's self. Imagine a city ordinance that
required all leaflets in the downtown area to be pre-screened for
appropriate content by the City Manager. 9 The constitutionality
of this ordinance would not be saved by the fact that one could
distribute the leaflets in the suburbs or simply write letters to the
editor.
My view is that the government cannot constitutionally require that all unrated programming must be shown during the safe
harbor period, although it can require that, during a seven year
"sunset" interval, all unrated indecent programming be shown
during the safe harbor period. It can do so because-assuming
that the current safe harbor period regime is constitutional-unrated indecent programming would be no less protected
before the Act than after it.60
Nevertheless, the government must allow all other programming to be shown outside of the safe harbor period whether it is

theirs. If a local station did not agree with a rating supplied by a network, it would be

free to change the rating. I& These remarks suggest that the rules about who would do
the rating or have the final say might differ for cable and regular broadcast programming.
58. There is also the related danger that the same program might receive different
ratings from different distributors. The media representatives' agreement with President

Clinton sought to allay these concerns by promising to establish an oversight group that
would periodically review ratings of specific programs and comment on whether they met

the industry's ratings guidelines. Lewis, supra note 53.
59. Cf Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down prohibition of
distribution of literature in city streets without permit from City Manager).
60. Assuming that safe harbor rules for regulation of particularly violent programming would be constitutional under the current regime, a similar argument would
apply to this programming as well.
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rated or not, and whether or not it has been submitted to a third
party. When broadcasters cannot or will not rate programs by
themselves, the government must place the burden on third-party
ratings systems to provide ratings in time for broadcast. It cannot
put the burden on broadcasters to obtain or accept a rating before
broadcasting.
To see why the burden must rest on the ratings board and
not on broadcasters, consider the problems involved with blocking
access to three different groups of unrated programs: The first are
pre-Act programs, the second are news programs, and the third
are broadcasts of live events, including sporting events.
There is currently an enormous backlog of programs produced
before the development and implementation of the V-chip. They
include literally everything heretofore recorded on movie film or
videotape. If the concern is sexual content and violence, many
parents might well want to restrict access to much of this pre-Act
material. But if this material would not have fallen afoul of the
indecency standard of Section 1464, it is doubtful whether the
government could constitutionally require it to be shown only
during the safe harbor period. The contrary result would be ludicrous: Imagine the federal government holding that a rerun of
"M*A*S*H" or "The Mary Tyler Moore Show" originally broadcast during prime time in 1975 must now be shown after 10 p.m.
because it has not yet been rated.
The constitutional problems are even more obvious when we
come to programs like news reports that often cannot be prepared
well in advance. Should we say that the "NBC Nightly News" cannot be broadcast except in the safe harbor period because Tom
Brokaw did not pre-screen it with an industry council? And
should the same reasoning apply to CNN broadcasts from the
former Yugoslavia or the latest results from the New Hampshire
primary?
Live performances present similar difficulties. Industry officials
can surely pre-screen scripts if they are available. But the government must not be able to shunt all live performance into the safe
harbor period simply because a bureaucracy cannot pre-screen it.
It is important to stress that when we talk about live programming, we are not speaking primarily about raunchy talk shows at
two o'clock in the afternoon. We are talking about the World Series and the Super Bowl, as well as late-breaking news and public
affairs programming. I doubt Chairman Hundt would insist that
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President Clinton give his State of the Union Address during the
safe harbor period because the speech had not been prescreened.6
The constitutional problems posed by unrated programming
can easily be solved. V-chip technology should be designed to
allow viewers to block out all unrated material. This puts the onus
where it belongs, on the parent to avoid watching unrated material, rather than on the networks to rate it. In addition, the FCC
should permit broadcasters to insert a special category code for
news and public affairs programming, a code that could be routinely assigned to local and national news programs without prescreening for sexual and violent content. (Another code could be
offered for sports programming). Parents then would have the
option of watching or not watching such programming on the
assumption that the vast majority of news and public affairs programming will not be harmful to children even though it will not
have been pre-screened.
The preliminary agreement between President Clinton and
media executives contemplates that sports and news programming
will be unrated.62 However, because much adult-oriented and experimental programming will also be unrated, the industry's solution is likely to cause problems in the future. By giving all news
(and sports) programming a special ratings code, we would prevent these programs from being lumped together with all other
"unrated" programming. This would allow parents to avoid all
unrated programming and still watch news and sports without
constantly having to change the settings on their V-chip.63 If
news and sports programming remain unrated, the danger is not
that people will refuse to watch news and sports programming.
The danger is that there will be enormous political and financial
pressures to ensure that all unrated programming is acceptable for
all children, so that unrated programming becomes equivalent to a
G movie rating. The latter result is the exact opposite of what a
V-chip system should accomplish.
61.

Of course, given President Clinton's natural propensities, the speech might go on

into the safe harbor period anyway.
62. John M. Broder & Jane Hall, President Hears TV Executives Commit to Ratings
System, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at Al.
63. This is in keeping with the general goal, discussed earlier, of creating a filtering
system that requires as little effort by (and as little technological sophistication of) par-

ents as possible. See supra part V.
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I have argued that the constitutional problems of prior restraint can be avoided only if programs can be shown without prescreening or pre-rating; the burden must be on an external rating
organization to provide ratings in time for broadcast. One might
object that my solution allows broadcasters to do an end run
around the V-chip; they can simply refuse to provide or obtain
ratings, and put on violent and sexually charged programming
without effectively being blocked out. But this result is unlikely to
occur as long as parents are empowered to block out all unrated
programs. Broadcasters, after all, are not insensitive to advertisers,
and advertisers will be unlikely to spend their dollars on unrated
programming if they believe that a substantial number of parents
will block such programming. Thus, even without the use of a
prior restraint, broadcasters will have considerable financial incentives to submit all programming to a private industry ratings board
(or rate it themselves) when they can. In the case of live broadcasts, they will take whatever steps are necessary to guarantee a
rating beforehand. Thus, for the vast majority of programming that
most families want to watch, it will be possible to obtain a rating
before broadcast. This is especially so if broadcasters are permitted to give news and sports programming a special rating without
pre-screening. 64
This solution is not without costs. Local cable access programming and other programs that do not or cannot submit to ratings
can still be shown under my proposed solution. However, they will
not be picked up in the homes of parents who have blocked out
all unrated programs. Moreover, my solution will still tend to
segregate programming that does not submit to pre-screening
along with programming that remains unrated for strategic rea64. The use of a special code for live news and sports raises its own problems.
Among the most obvious is whether faux-journalism shows like "Geraldo" and "Hard
Copy" should be classified as "public affairs programming" along with the "NBC Nightly
News" and the State of the Union Address, or should be treated under the general rat-

ings system. There are reasons to think that the latter solution is preferable, especially if
a program devotes a substantial amount of its air time to sexually charged material. But
this leads to dicey questions about what is "really" news and public affairs and what is
not. See Jane Hall, TV Content-Rating Planners Weigh Category Refinements, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Apr. 7, 1996, at 2C.
The concern about "Geraldo" is, of course, symptomatic of a larger problem. If
media executives really played fair in assigning V-chip ratings, it might well turn out that
the vast majority of daytime television-lurid talk shows and steamy soap operas-is
unsuitable for children due to its pervasively sexual content. Perhaps it's a good thing
most kids are in school during those hours.
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sons-for example, sexually explicit and violent programming. This
will result in a smaller audience for such programming, and less
advertising revenues. But it nevertheless ensures that people who
want to watch this programming can have access to it, and at any
time of day. In this sense it is more consistent with First Amendment values than the alternative.
VIII. THE V-CHIP AND THE DELEGATION OF INFORMATIONAL
FILTERING

So far, I have spoken only about the constitutional issues
raised by the V-chip. Yet the deeper problems that the V-chip
raises lie elsewhere, and it is likely that these problems are not
constitutionally cognizable ones. They concern the power over
individual thought and national culture that arises with increasingly
powerful forms of delegation of informational access. This problem
is by no means new. Delegation of informational access has always
existed in one form or another. But my concern is that, in the
Information Age, the shape of culture will increasingly be determined by those persons and organizations who organize, filter, and
present information for others and to others. I fear that neither
the proponents nor opponents of the V-chip fully grasp this fact.
Although these features already exist in the world we now inhabit,
they will surely be magnified in the world we now enter.
The regulatory apparatus surrounding the V-chip will work an
enormous new delegation of informational filtering to a centralized
bureaucracy, whether one operated by the federal government or
one operated by private industry.' This new bureaucracy will be
entrusted with the task of devising and implementing filters for
virtually all of the television programs available in the United
States. It will have to determine both the salient characteristics of
all programming and evaluate which programs fit within the
boundaries defined by these characteristics. These characteristics
and these evaluations will in turn be employed by viewers and,
more importantly, by advertisers, cable providers, video rental
stores, public libraries, television production companies, writers,
composers, and directors. As these evaluations become commonly

65. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, for example, provides that the advisory
committee shall be assigned "such staff and resources as may be necessary to permit it
to perform its functions efficiently and promptly." § 551(b)(2)(B), 110 Stat. at 141.
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employed, further choices and social arrangements will then be
organized around them. In this way, the divisions of the cultural
and informational world created by the custodians of the V-chip,
however innocent, will be amplified throughout our culture, shaping and skewing the social world in unforeseen ways. It is possible
that we shall have nothing to fear from these effects. But it is
equally likely that there is much to fear. It is probable that some
version of these effects is inevitable. But it is certain that no
particular version is inevitable.
Filtering mechanisms are not neutral means of organization,
blocking and selection. They have important effects on what kinds
of materials are subsequently produced and how social arrangements are subsequently organized. People who produce and receive information respond to and organize their lives around the
existing forms of filtering. I do not yet know the many ways that
the filtering mechanisms devised for the V-chip will affect our culture. Indeed, I am quite sure that we will not be able to recognize
them for many years after they have already taken hold. All I can
do here is offer the most minor examples of mechanisms that may
have major consequences.
I want to focus on three basic kinds of effects. The first has
to do with what characteristics are salient in forming categories-for example, bad language or nudity. The second has to do
with coarseness-how fine-grained the filtering categories are. The
third concerns equivalency-what kinds of things are seen as parts
of equivalent categories. These factors overlap, but they are also
distinct. Two ratings systems can be equally coarse and yet view
different characteristics as salient. Moreover, two ratings systems
can be equally coarse and view different sorts of things as equivalent in each category. Consider two ratings systems that each have
only two categories. The first system holds that any profane language or any mention of contraception places a program in the
adult category, while the second includes only profanity. The two
systems are equally coarse, but they have different senses of
equivalency. In the first system, profanity and discussions of contraception are treated alike as inappropriate for children; in the
second system they are treated differently.
The first problem of any ratings system is what characteristics
count in making programming unsuitable for children. The most
likely ratings system will focus on the categories of sexual content,

1996]

FILTERING BROADCASTS

1167

nudity, violence, and profane language.6 These factors basically
track the considerations currently employed by the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) ratings system. 7 It is much less
likely that racist, sexist, or homophobic language and depictions

will be included as salient categories. Yet if parents are concerned
with what their children pick up from television, they might be

particularly concerned whether their children are picking up habits
of intolerance. The harm to our children from these influences,

one might think, would be equally as great as the harm from
exposure to sex, violence, and bad language. And both sets of
criteria involve content-based distinctions.
Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that either an industry ratings
board or an FCC-appointed television advisory committee will
code for racist, sexist, or homophobic expression. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 expressly states that ratings systems are to
avoid political and ideological categorizations.' These bodies will

66. For example, according to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Television
Commission is charged with "rating of video programming that contains sexual, violent,
or other indecent material about which parents should be informed before it is displayed
to children." § 551(b)(1), 110 Stat. at 140.
67. The February 29, 1996 agreement between President Clinton and representatives
of the media industry contemplates that the eventual industry system will resemble the
MPAA system, even if it will not necessarily be identical to it. Broder & Hall, supra
note 62, at Al; Marks, supra note 53, at 3.
One major problem with the current MPAA system is that the ratings are awarded
by a committee of laypersons who have no particular expertise in what kinds of violence
are actually the most harmful for children to watch. So it is likely that some movies
rated R for their violence may actually be less harmful than some rated PG-13. Of
course, there is no guarantee that an industry-produced ratings system will match the
results of psychological studies any better.
68. The Act insists that "nothing in [the requirement of ratings provisions] shall be
construed to authorize any rating of video programming on the basis of its political or
religious content." § 551(b)(2), 110 Stat. at 140. Furthermore, the advisory committee that
informs the television commission is to be "composed of parents, television broadcasters,
television programming producers, cable operators, appropriate public interest groups, and
other interested individuals from the private sector," and is to be "fairly balanced in
terms of political affiliation, the points of view represented, and the functions to be performed by the committee." Id.
One assumes that the same caveats will apply to any industry-created ratings system, since under § 551(e)(1)(A) of the Act the FCC will not issue guidelines for ratings
if private industry has established rules "acceptable to the commission." § 551(e)(1)(A),
110 Stat. at 142.
By contrast, under the ratings system now being tested in Canada, "language offensive to minorities or ethnic groups" can be blocked out by a V-chip. It gains a rating of
3 out of a possible 5 on the language scale, with 5 being the most offensive. Verne Gay,
Ratings Soon: TV Industry to Code Shows by Next Year, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1996, at A3.
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probably argue that coding or blocking programming as racist, sexist, or homophobic would give the unmistakable appearance of
political favoritism.
Yet this objection reveals the problems that already exist with
the most likely system of ratings-one organized around depictions
of sexual conduct, violence, and profanity. The choice to protect
our children from these things rather than others cannot be said
to be truly apolitical, even if it can be assured to be mainstream.
While overt expressions of homophobia are likely to remain
uncoded, overt homosexual expressions of affection will probably
be among the first to be coded as inappropriate for children. The
social equality of homosexuals is currently a political hot potato,
and one is quite sure in which direction this particular potato will
get dropped.69
The very assumption that exposure to racist messages is less
harmful to our children and our community than exposure to
violence already carries considerable political freight. Although
coding for violence but not for racism seems to exclude political
and ideological controversy, it does not avoid politics or ideology.
Rather it installs them in the very process of coding. The actual
practice of political and religious "neutrality" will be achieved by
the selective avoidance of topics; it will produce the appearance
but hardly the reality of apolitical judgment.70

In effect, the Canadian system equates the "F-word" with the "N-word;" it thus raises
many of the problems of equivalent degrees of offensiveness discussed infra. Moreover,
under this system, even though racial epithets are coded, they are judged less offensive
than many other possible expressions. Id.
69. Coding for violence and for homophobia both involve content-based distinctions.
However, it may be objected that coding for violence, unlike homophobia, is viewpoint
neutral. But this example shows how tenuous this distinction can be in practice. Simple,
ordinary demonstrations of affection between gays-the kind that would pass unnoticed
between heterosexuals-are important means of showing the normalcy of gay lives and
the commonality of their basic concerns with those of straight audiences. Yet these displays are likely to be judged unsuitable for children while negative portrayals of gays will
pass unfiltered by the system.
70. My point in raising these difficulties is not to call for the coding of racist expressions. It is rather to note the politics implicit in a coding system that focuses on violence
and indecency to the exclusion of other factors. Coding for racist messages, even if constitutional, would prove very difficult in practice. Often racial stereotypes are used in
ironic ways, in which it is difficult to tell their actual meaning, much less their long term
effects. Black-oriented comedy shows like "In Living Color" and "Martin" routinely employ exaggerated racial stereotypes of minorities. It is difficult to know where one would
begin in classifying this material.
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Many people would probably be content with a ratings system
that, even if not guaranteed to be nonideological, would at least
be doggedly centrist. That is probably the best reason to have an
industry-sponsored ratings system, which will cater to the tastes
(or, more appropriately, the fears) of advertisers. But if ratings
guidelines are entrusted to a federally-appointed television advisory committee, there is no guarantee of even this. Rather, the protection of family values through a ratings system is likely to take
on decidedly different political spins under successive administrations. Nothing prevents a future committee from changing its mind
about ratings guidelines if they should prove unsatisfactory or
outmoded. And if the FCC has control over who sits on such an
advisory committee, the guidelines produced by that committee
will probably change over time depending on the regnant political
forces (including subsequent Presidential appointments to the
Commission).
Chairman Hundt, an appointee of President Clinton, would be
in charge of assembling the first such advisory commission. Neither Clinton nor his appointees are immune from political pressures, as the very decision to run the 1996 presidential campaign
on "values" issues like the V-chip clearly shows. Even so, one
wonders whether the ratings system produced under the watchful
eye of an FCC commissioner appointed by President Pat Buchanan or even President Robert Dole would not differ from one
produced under Chairman Hundt's supervision. The more the FCC
becomes involved in the ratings system, the more heavily that
system will become politicized. It is politics, after all, that has led
to the new system, and politics will not soon depart once the
system is in place.
Once again, this is not to say that industry-developed ratings
will be less affected by politics.7 ' Any industry-developed ratings
system must still be approved by the FCC. Moreover, it is likely
that future politicians will attempt to make political hay by bash-

What advocates of rating systems may not realize, however, is that similar problems
apply to depictions of violence. Violence is often used to show a character in a bad

light, or to punish the wicked and the violent. Much violence is portrayed in a cartoonlike fashion. The many ways in which violence can be depicted, and the many social

meanings it can convey, underscore that, like racist expression, there will be no easy way
to code it.

71. Although it is quite probable that the wishes of advertisers will have a more
direct and substantial effect. But it is hard to know whether this is cause for rejoicing.
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ing any industry ratings system and threatening a government
takeover. Just as Senator Dole today boosts his campaign for the
presidency by denouncing the wickedness of Hollywood, pseudopopulists of the future will discover an irresistible temptation to
denounce whatever ratings system emerges as toothless and sinful,
endangering the lives of our children and the future of America.
Thus, even if the industry adopts its own system, the result may
still be politicized. The use of industry-developed ratings is only
the lesser of two considerable evils.
Coarseness of the ratings system is a second major concern.
The current motion picture ratings system is perhaps the best
example of how coarseness operates in practice. The MPAA currently offers a rating system featuring six categories-Unrated, G,
PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17.72 Ratings are determined by a panel
of full-time employees using a combination of factors, including
theme, violence, sexual content, and language.' Because these
factors are taken together rather than differentiated, motion picture producers face a relatively coarse filtering mechanism. In fact,
the PG-13 category was added later on because the previous system included too much in the PG category! 4
Some effects of the system occur at the far end of the spectrum. Producers know that an NC-17 rating will significantly cut
into movie sales. Many movie theaters will not show NC-17 movies, 75 many newspapers and television stations will not advertise
them,76 and they are not carried by major video chains like
Blockbuster.' Hence producers take great pains to gain an R
rating from the MPAA board, often offering to cut out offending
materials.' Although the desire to obtain an R rating may pro72.

The X rating originally devised by the motion picture industry has been aban-

doned, and is now used primarily by adult video producers as a way of emphasizing the
salacious nature of their product. See Leonard Klady et al., Sticks Can't Nix Naughty Pix:
'Showgirls' Wide Release Pushes NC-17 Envelope, VARIETY, July 24-30, 1995, at 1.
73.

Jack Valenti, The Voluntary Movie Rating System, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS

BOOK 396, 401-02 (Jason E. Squire ed., 1992); Richard P. Salgado, Regulating a Video
Revolution, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 516, 519-20 (1989).
74. Richard Zoglin, Gremlins in the Rating System: Two Hit Films Raise New Con-

cerns About Protecting Children, TIME, June 25, 1984, at 78.
75.

Rachel Eisendrath, Film Industry Rates NC-17, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Oct

29, 1995, at 1H (reporting decision by Carmike Cinemas, a chain of 2,104 screens scattered through the South, not to show "Showgirls" because of its NC-17 rating).
76. See Richard Corliss, What Ever Became of NC-17?, TIME, Jan. 27, 1992, at 64.
77. See John Greenwald, Wayne's World, the Sequel, TIME, Oct. 11, 1993, at 64, 67.
78. Although the director does not directly negotiate with the film board, strategic
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duce self-censorship, movies with an NC-17 rating can still be
shown to consenting adults.
A more curious and perverse effect happens on the other side
of the ratings spectrum. Although a G rating signifies that a movie
is suitable for all audiences, it also tends to drive away teenagers
and young adults, who are among the most avid consumers of
movies. As a result, the ratings system produces a perverse incentive to "dirty up" pictures to make them attractive to a wider
audience. 9 Apparently many Americans demand genuine family
entertainment; they just don't want to have to see it themselves.
Any system of ratings will produce self-censorship because
movie makers fear losing a desired audience. A movie producer
has to balance the potential gains that might come from a change
in content with the loss resulting from a corresponding change in
movie rating. But the more important coarseness effects occur in
the middle of the ratings spectrum. A ratings system that does not
differentiate between sex, violence, and profanity will actually
encourage the use of all three. For example, suppose that as a
result of using several four-letter words a movie gains an R rating.
At that point the movie director has every reason to put in additional sexual content and violence if she believes this will increase
audience attention, as long as she doesn't cross the line into
NC-17. She is guaranteed not to lose audience share because of a
change in rating but she can hope to gain audience share by strategically increasing sexual or violent content. As a result, movies
in the middle range of ratings may tend to get progressively more
violent and more sexually explicit at the same time.
If, as seems likely, the V-chip system uses ratings as coarse as
the MPAA, the broadcast world will display similar effects. The
MPAA ratings resemble the anthropologist's two basic categories
of the sacred and the profane. There is a category of that which is

behavior is apparently not uncommon. Martin Scorcese was reported to have deliberately
added ultraviolent material to his film "Casino" so that later cuts would seem tame by
comparison, thus enabling him to keep in material he thought essential. Steve Daly, In
the Ratings Game, Ultraviolence is the Ace in the Hole, ENT. WKLY., Aug. 18, 1995, at 8.
Another possible alternative is to refuse the MPAA rating and release the film as
unrated. See Edward Guthmann, Director Finds Gender Does Matter, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
25, 1995, at Cl (describing the decision to release "When Night is Falling," a drama
which included two lesbian love scenes, as unrated). But this does not avoid stigma, and
indeed, may even invite it.
79. Film Censors; Child-Minders, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at 78.
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suitable for children (taking the role of the sacred) and a category
in which everything else-violence, bad language, nudity, homosexuality-gets thrown in indiscriminately (the profane).,0 What is
profane is then subdivided not by kind of expression but by degree of profaneness, resulting in a world consisting of what is
sacred, a bit profane, a lot profane, and seriously profane."
On the other hand, if substantive categories are increasingly
differentiated, the system produces a different set of incentives. It
may pay for the director to produce a film with increased violence
but not sexual content, and vice versa, because a change at the
margins is better reflected in the ratings system. Of course, the
more categories are added, the more difficult it becomes for parents to operate the system. As noted earlier, one of the most
important constraints on the V-chip system will be ensuring ease
of use to technologically-challenged adults.' So the result is likely to be a compromise between coarseness and adequacy of ratings.
A third and final set of problems with any ratings system
concerns equivalency. Even after the basic categories are determined, any ratings system will have to decide what gets coded
within each category. More important for present purposes, it will
have to decide what gets coded as possessing equal levels of inappropriateness. Like decisions about the categories themselves,
these decisions cannot avoid political controversy; they are likely
to have wide-ranging effects.
Take, for example, discussions of homosexuality or of safe sex
as a means of preventing AIDS. How should these be coded in a
ratings system? And what should they be coded as equivalent to?
Some parents would see a big difference between such discussions
and a sexually titillating love scene, while other parents would find
both categories equally unsuitable for people under the age of

80. Richard Corliss, It's Great! Don't Show It! A Misguided Rating System Slaps an
X on a Discreetly Erotic Film, TIME, Sept. 17, 1990, at 70 (discussing NC-17 ratings

given to Director Philip Kaufman's film, "Henry and June," and controversies over other
films involving lesbian scenes).
81. Note that the categories do not necessarily have to be organized around content.
They can also be organized around age, much like children's toys. Thus, one can have
programming suitable for children over age 4, children over age 8, children over 13,
children over the age of 17, and so on. The MPAA ratings system does this to some
degree, with its G, PG-13, and NC-17 ratings. The substance of age-based ratings, however, ultimately derives from decisions about underlying content.
82. See supra part V.

1996]

FILTERING BROADCASTS

1173

eighteen. Now imagine a made-for-television movie that depicts a
fictional cover-up by the church hierarchy of child abuse allegations made against Catholic priests, and a movie in which Freddy
Krueger murders a hapless teenage couple having sex in the
woods at midnight. It is not difficult to imagine different groups of
parents disagreeing heatedly about the relative inappropriateness
for children of these two examples.
Questions of equivalency severely test any facade of political
neutrality. Does the ratings system regard two men kissing as
equivalent to a woman being raped or another being slashed with
a knife? Does the system regard a discussion of contraception as
more or less inappropriate than a discussion of drug use? Whether
or not we regard these events as really being different in kind is
irrelevant. What is important is whether the ratings system makes
them equivalent, by coding them as equally appropriate or inappropriate for children. Once materials are coded as equivalent,
they become equivalent for all purposes for which the ratings
system is used. And, make no mistake, the ratings system will be
used for purposes other than its designers intended.
Advertisers deciding where to invest their dollars, video rental
stores purchasing and organizing inventory, parental groups demanding tighter controls on undesirable programming, and consumers searching for suitable entertainment will not easily be able
to differentiate within categories created by a ratings system. They
will not have to. Rather, they will use the ratings system to avoid
having to engage in such differentiations. They will rely on the
categories already provided to choose what to purchase, what to
watch, what to protest, and what to invest in. The ratings system
will come ready-made as a division of the programming universe,
and the efficiency and ubiquity of the system will make its distinctions real in practice.
Just as parental groups today do not watch NC-17 movies
before protesting their inclusion in suburban movie complexes or
local video stores,83 people will use the television ratings system

83. See, eg., Michael Granberry, 'Temptation. Some Resist, Others Yawn, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 20, 1988, § 2, at 2; Julia McCord, Film on Fallen Priests Sparks Pastor Protest,
OMAHA WoRLD-HRALD, Apr. 7, 1995, at 13SF; Sean P. Means, Pickets Organize to
Protest 'Showgirls' in Utah: Kids' Movies and Skin Flicks a Bad Mix, Protesters Say, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 28, 1995, at B1; Victor Volland, Video Stores Have 'Priest'" Groups
Protest, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1996, at 5D.
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as a guide to the content of rated programming. The categories
produced by a ratings board, whether public or private, will be the
key informational filters that others will use to organize their
decisions, whether monetary, political, or aesthetic.
Nevertheless, it is possible that events will play out quite
differently. If cable bandwidth is expanded-for example, through
digital delivery systems-there may be room for several different
ratings systems. Groups like the Christian Coalition may offer
their own ratings system using V-chip technology, employing their
own conception of what is family-friendly and what is not. Consumers can then subscribe to the ratings system of their choice,
much as they now subscribe to magazines like TV Guide. Moreover, an explosion of space on cable systems promises the possibility of filtering systems based on any number of programming
criteria. The only limitation upon would-be filterers is their ability
to catalogue and categorize the millions of hours of materials that
will eventually exist for television, and their ability to gain sufficient market share to underwrite the costs of rating this material.
This possible future presents a different set of problems. On
the one hand, if the number of ratings systems that can survive
commercially is quite small, the result will not be too dissimilar
from what I have described above. The more interesting possibility
is that ratings systems and related forms of media filters will proliferate. Consumers will be able to insulate themselves in increasingly specialized programming universes. By delegating their choices to specialized media filtering companies, they can filter out the
great mass of programming to focus narrowly on their own special
interests. Some, I suspect, will see this as the ultimate vindication
of autonomy. Others will mourn the loss of a common televisual
culture. In any case, this scenario produces effects completely
opposite of the first. Instead of a single filtering system uncannily
structuring and skewing thought and culture, the alternative scenario imagines an increasingly fractured community of individuals
fixated on their personal programming universe and increasingly
oblivious to everything else.
Standing as we are, still in the infancy of the Information
Age, it is impossible to tell how events will play out. But we can
already appreciate the deep irony of our situation. The call for the
V-chip, like the call for censorship of the Internet, stems from a
sincerely felt anxiety that our culture is spinning out of control
and an earnest desire to strike back at those new technologies
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thought to form part of the cause. The promotion of the V-chip as
the solution to this cultural anxiety is at once appropriate and
perverse. It is appropriate because it uses technology to fight the
perceived effects of technology. It is perverse in that, like all other
technologies before it, our submission to it is destined to have
immeasurable and unexpected consequences.
The inevitable emergence of filtering organizations, whether
public or private, underscores the importance of distinguishing between delegation and choice-the distance between the informational future that awaits us and the attractive homilies of autonomy and personal empowerment now used to describe it. We are
on the verge of installing a series of new filtering mechanisms that
will transform the most important systems of mass communication
available to us. We do this to satisfy the concerns of parents and
the ambitions of politicians. But as we do this, we might be well
advised to stop for a moment, and try to imagine what is as yet
unimaginable-the profound though unintended effects of this
potent combination of bureaucracy and technology on the health
of our democracy and the evolution of our culture.

